Dr. Nicos Panayioides/Head of GEOPAME

Italy and the Middle East is a comprehensive analysis of Italy’s diachronic involvement in the Middle East. It is a collective volume written by prominent specialists that deal with all aspects of the foreign policy of Italy in the Middle East, the historical, the political, the strategic and the fight against transnational terrorism as well.

I firmly believe that this book fills a gap in the international bibliography. More specifically, the international literature on the Middle East is dominated by England’s and France’s role in shaping the borders of the current Middle East state system. Two great powers, whose their political strategies in the region especially after the First and Second World Wars, but also during the Cold War era are criticized by many scholars as one of the causes for the political instability that characterizes the Middle East until now.

In contrast as we are informed by this book, Italy’s foreign policy in the Middle East was less biased and more constructive in regard with the regional conflicts in the region such as the Israeli-Palestinian question where Italy followed a policy of equidistance. While not delegitimizing the State of Israel, Rome followed a less biased foreign policy more towards the Arabs and more sympathetic for the plight of the Palestinian people in particular.

That being said, does not mean that Italy did not follow on various occasions a policy of raison d’état trying to safeguard particular strategic and economic interests such as the need,for example, to safeguard the energy supplies. What I want to point out is that Rome’s policies as a middle power were bereft from the zero sum logic that prevailed during the Cold War in the strategic planning of the great powers, Washington, Μοscow, London and Paris. In particular as we learn, Italy sought and in many occasions applied a less biased foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern states and their rulers.

Τhe first part οf the book is comprised by two chapters: Αn introductory chapter that introduces the reader to the vital importance of the Middle East in international affairs in general and in the Cold War context in particular, where the power competition between the US and the USSR was the main characteristic of the bipolar international system. The Middle East with its vital strategic importance would take a primary role in the competing grand strategies of the two superpowers.

The second chapter examines the political consequences that the collapse of the bipolar international structure brought about on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More specifically, it demonstrates how the emerging post Cold War order impacted on the Palestinians’ actions that forced them to sign the Oslo Accords, the agreements that sought to lead to a solution – unsuccessfully though – of the most perplexed international question.

The second part of the book analyzes the main aspects of the birth and the evolution of Italian foreign policy in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean: this was characterized by two main elements, or putting it differently it was a two-fold process. On the one hand the effort to build a new role in the region after the Second World War and on the other – by doing so – not to upset the delicate balance resulted from the fact that Italy was an important NATO and EU member and therefore her policies should be aligned to a great extent with those of her partners.

After the Second World War Rome abandoned its hegemonic plans for the region and sought to preserve its political, economic and cultural influence on its former colonies and in the Middle East in general. Αt the same time, Italy intensified its political and economical relations with the Arab states.

However, as the book demonstrates, on many occasions Italian policies contradicted with the policies of Washington who had different strategic plans and agenda for the Middle East.
For example, this was manifested after the Arab-Israeli War of Yom Kippur in 1973 and the Arab oil embargo that followed. Then, Rome displayed a constructive approach for the evolution of the Europe-Arab dialogue (EAD) acting as a bridge country between the European Community (EC) and the Middle East-Mediterranean countries involved. Despite the result of the EAD initiative a new epoch of cooperation between the EC and the Arab states started.

Another point of divergence between Rome and Washington that deteriorated their relations was the different approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli actions against the Palestinians. For example, Rome disagreed with the “Wooden leg” operation in October 1985 against the PLO headquarters in Tunis and asked Washington to say if she was aware and gave its consent in advance for the Israeli raid. Unavoidably, the tense political climate led to the deterioration of Italian-Israeli relations and as it is characteristically mentioned in the book, when at one occasion Simon Peres said that Bettino Craxi colluded with terrorism, the Italian Prime Minister retaliated by calling Peres a terrorist.

Libya is another case where Italy sought to retain a sort of autonomy on its actions from her transatlantic partners. It promoted dialogue in her effort to establish a regional approach in a country that was seen by the West as a bulwark against the Soviets in the context of the so-called Arab-Cold War. However, the general upheaval in the Middle East with the emergence of Nasser as the pan-Arab leader sent shock waves across the Maghreb and Libya could not be an exception. The advent of Colonel Gaddafi to power in 1969 differentiated the strategic landscape when Tripoli became a reactionary state with a harsh rhetoric against colonialism and the West, Italy included.

Rome understood that a cautious approach was needed with the Colonel and therefore enhanced its economic relations with him and to some extend tolerated his actions. ENI’s involvement in the Libyan petrol industry is a paradigm of the aforementioned.

The differences between Washington and Rome over the management of Libya’s terrorist actions surfaced during the Sigonella Crisis in October 1985 and one year later when the Americans bombed the Gulf of Sidra. But even then, Rome sought to retain its autonomy over the Libyan regime and to promote dialogue instead of punitive actions. However, the continuing isolation of Gaddafi and the growing instability during the so called “Arab Spring” led to his removal from power in 2011.

The last part of the book examines the Italian foreign policy in the greater Middle East. As regards Italy-Turkey relations, they were characterized by the need of Rome to promote particular strategic goals in the Mediterranean region. Turkey with its pivotal position in Eurasia acted as bridge between Europe and Asia in terms of conflict management in a volatile region during the Cold War. Italy supported the European ambitions of its Atlantic partner. However, regardless of the good bilateral political and economic relations between Ankara and Rome, Italy supported the general principles of the UN regarding the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkey in1974. In particular, Rome approved resolution 3212 of November 1974 and renounced the proclamation of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” in 1975 as well the illegal proclamation of  its independence in 1983.

This part of the books looks also at the relations between Iran and Italy. It demonstrates the importance of the political economy of oil in period of acute strategic instability for the West in general and for Italy in particular. As a vivid economic actor in the Middle East especially in oil industry, Rome acted with caution in order to safeguard its economic interests in the country.
This was not an easy scheme especially after the 1979 revolution in Iran and the ensuing enmity between Iran and the US, proclaimed by Teheran as the Great Satan, while the Jewish State was depicted as the Little Satan.

Another issue analyzed in the last part of the book is the sincere and constructive approach of Rome in the Afghan conflict, initially as a president of the then European Economic Community. It was an effort to contribute to the stabilization of the country and reach a compromisethat would allow Moscow save its prestige and withdraw her troops from Afghanistan. But also after the Russian withdrawal from the Afghan country, Italy used its diplomatic leverage and her good relations with Moscow in order to reach a political solution, despite Washington’s objection who wanted full military victory over the mujahideen there.

Finally, regarding the sub-Indian continent we detect that the Italian foreign policy aimed to establish cordial relations with Pakistan in order to increase its political and economic influence in the newly decolonized state. A state with a pro-western orientation, Pakistan was the most populated Islamic state at the time and therefore it was very important for Rome’s regional strategy to become a ‘bridge’ between the West and the Islamic world. However, as we saw in the Turkish paradigm, Rome was very cautious in its regional approach not to upset the regional balances by taking extremely pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir.

Ιn conclusion, “Italy and the Middle East” is a profound contribution to the field of the Middle East studies, based on a variety of primary sources and secondary as well. It is a fascinating and well written book that puts the Middle East in a multidimensional context. I propose this book not only to experts of International Relations/Middle East Studies, but also to those who want to receive general knowledge for the Middle East, especially about the foreign policy of Italy in a very important from a geostrategic aspect region.