George Issa, Journalist – Annahar Newspaper -Lebanon

The situation in Idlib and its surroundings is no longer as calm as it was in the second half of September and most of October. Two weeks ago, government forces clashed with opposition fighters in the province of Hama during one of the fiercest battles in northwestern Syria in a year, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
More than 20 al-Azza fighters have been killed and scores wounded in the biggest casualties among the opposition in the region for months. Despite the large attack and the high toll of deaths, there was no expectation of a major attack by the regime after the latter withdrew after the clashes, according to the director of the Observatory Rami Abdel Rahman in an interview with the French Press Agency.

Last week, clashes broke out in the northwestern Hama countryside at the outer edges of the demilitarized zone after jihadi groups attacked positions of the regime’s forces, killing at least nine of them. The Sochi agreement has not been built on solid ground, as there are differences between the parties involved. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has previously said that the agreement is temporary, while Iran relies hard on the need to restore Damascus control over all Syrian territory. However, according to some observers, this agreement was not absolutely bad for Damascus and Tehran, so long as, in principle, Ankara will abide by the agreement that leads to the dismantling of jihadist groups, especially the Sham Liberation Organization. But even If Turkey fails to achieve this task, is Iran going to end the Sochi agreement?

The Iranian position

Tehran may not be rushing to end the effects of Sochi. In terms of form, it may not be comfortable with a bilateral agreement on Syria that was not involved. Despite the importance of this point, the latter may not be the only factor Tehran takes seriously. A military attack on Idlib will mean primarily the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees into Turkey, which does not directly affect Iran’s interests, but it may harm its relationship with the Turks in particular, something it does not want especially at the current stage.
The absence of Iran’s escalating rhetoric towards Idlib could be due to the fact that Tehran is facing a second round of US sanctions. Turkey was one of the eight countries to receive temporary exemptions for the purchase of Iranian oil. Exemption in itself may not be an effective factor in bilateral relations. What Tehran may take into consideration is repeated statements made by Turkish officials about their failure to comply with US sanctions over the past months.
In July, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Cavusoglu said his country’s authorities had informed a US delegation from Treasury and Foreign Affairs officials that Ankara would buy oil from Iran regardless of Penalties imposed. Less than a month later, a similar statement was made by Cavusoglu on the same subject. More striking was Erdogan’s statement after receiving the exemption, which severely attacked the sanctions. “US sanctions on Iran are wrong, for us they are steps aimed at destabilizing the world, we do not want to live in an imperial world,” he said.

How did Trump “strengthen” Erdogan’s position?

The Turkish vision may be one of the main reasons why Tehran avoids upsetting the Turkish president in the Idlib case. On October 17, The Nation quoted the Syrian opposition representative in Astana Ahmad Touma as saying: “Do you think that Iran wants to anger Turkey, a neighboring country that will need it to ease the effects of sanctions and sanctions on Iran?” The sanctions against Iran have inadvertently reinforced Erdogan’s negotiating position during his talks with the Russians and Iranians about the fate of Idlib, pointed out Sam Heller, a political analyst on Syrian affairs in the International Crisis Group.

Not all observers agree with this view. The head of the Middle East and East Mediterranean Observatory, Dr. Nick Panayotides, is expressing a different view that does not see US sanctions against Iran as a key factor in reaching the Sochi agreement. Panayotides explains to An-Nahar that the agreement was signed by a great power, Russia, Iran’s ally in Syria, whose support to Assad proved catalytic for his survival. In this regard, Iran’s interests in Syria were safeguarded. Furthermore according to his opinion, Tehran also did not want for its part an armed confrontation in Syria, in Idlib region in particular, that could open the Pandora box for an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict between major and regional powers and probably between allies. “Let’s remind that there is a delicate balance of power in the region (Iran and Russia who support Assad plus Turkey who oppose Assad.) vs USA, Israel who are against Assad”.

But what about Erdogan’s opposition to sanctions?

Panayiotides points out that relations between Washington and Ankara are moving on a peculiar path that of “no friends no enemies.” The gap remains despite Pompeo’s meeting with Cavusoglu yesterday, he said. As long as this continues an element of uncertainty and possible source of instability is added to the Syrian-Middle East equation. All the involved actors in the conflict-Iran included Iran know this and are very cautious in their foreign policy calculations.
Panayiotides said also that, Tehran and Ankara have many complementary interests-from energy- economical to political issues- despite the fact that they support different sides in the Syrian Civil War. This was manifested when Turkish diplomacy put itself against Trump’s decision to withdraw US from Iranian nuclear agreement of 2015 and when afterwards declared explicitly that will not abide by the sanctions.

Thus, while observers find that the sanctions against Iran and Turkey’s intention to disobey them have given Erdogan a privileged position in the negotiations over Idlib’s fate, others believe that relations between Turkey and Iran have a framework beyond sanctions. Does any of the possible tracks affect the sustainability of this Sochi deal?